The borders of a just war. by Williams, J.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
28 June 2007
Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Unknown
Citation for published item:
Williams, J. (2007) ’The borders of a just war.’, Working Paper. Durham University, School of Government
and International Affairs, Durham.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://www.dur.ac.uk/sgia/working/
Publisher’s copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
SGIA Research Working Papers Series 
 
 
The Borders of a Just War 
 
 
Dr John Williams 
Durham University 
 
 
June 2007 
 
SGIARWP07-03 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Borders of a Just War 
 
 
 
Dr John Williams 
Durham University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in the SGIA Research Working Papers Series are those of the author(s) and 
do not necessarily reflect those of the School or of Durham University.  These wide ranging 
Research Working Papers are products of the scholarship taking place in SGIA and are 
disseminated in this early form to encourage debate on the important academic and policy issues 
of our time.  Copyright belongs to the Author(s).  Bibliographical references to the SGIA 
Research Working Papers should be as follows:  Author(s), Paper Tile (Durham, UK: 
SGIARWP no., date). 
Dr John Williams studied at the Universities of Hull and Warwick. He is Deputy Head of the 
School of Government and International Affairs and a Senior Lecturer in International Relations. 
He is the author of numerous works including The Ethics of Territorial Borders: Drawing Lines 
in the Shifting Sand (2006) and ‘Hannah Arendt and an International Space In-Between' (2005). 
 
 3 
The Borders of a Just War 
 
Introduction 
This paper aims to contribute to the contemporary debate about Just War in a, hopefully, 
distinctive fashion. It seeks to map out (pun intended) a claim about the problematic nature of the 
way in which Just War theory has responded to the two main challenges surrounding the ethics 
of violence in international relations since the end of the Cold War – namely the debates about 
humanitarian intervention and the ‘war on terror’. The claim, and the pun, revolve around the 
understanding of the role and nature of territory in international politics, and specifically Just 
War theorists’ debates about these two challenges. In particular, the paper looks at a privileging 
of the territorial, bordered state in contemporary Just War debate in order to suggest how it is 
that non-state based political forms, projects and activities are marginalised in analysis and also 
ethically disadvantaged. Whilst we may well go along with the ethical condemnation of 
fundamentalist ‘jihadist’ versions, or perversions, of Islam, that kind of project – non-territorial, 
at least in the conventional sense, and separate from state-based conceptions of citizenship as the 
ethically ideal political relationship between individual and political authority, cannot gain a 
foothold within Just War’s response to changing patterns of violence.  
 
The paper proceeds in four principal stages. The first outlines the ‘triumph’ of Just War theory in 
shaping ethico-political responses to humanitarian intervention and the war on terror. This has 
generated some insightful and highly sophisticated thinking, developing the ancient tradition of 
Just War in appealing and intriguing ways.  
 
Critics, and there are more than the few this paper samples, have responded with some effective 
arguments of their own, but, in general, the paper argues in its second section, they have also 
missed out on the significance of scale and space for this issue. This is not to deny that they score 
some important points against Just War theory and the particular ways it is used in the 
contemporary debates about intervention and anti-terrorism. Here, the paper starts to outline the 
ideas of territory, scale and space that are important to its critique of Just War. It also shows how 
debates about scale are influencing other approaches to the changing patterns of violence in 
international relations. 
 
The relationship between space, scale and ethics is the principal subject of the paper’s third 
section, bringing in work in political geography and critical geopolitics in order to demonstrate 
the extent of the critique of ‘Westphalian’ territorial thinking that, I argue, is inherent and 
unquestioned in Just War debates.  
 
Finally, the paper turns to the ways in which this unreflective approach to the ethics of territory 
works to privilege the state in contemporary developments of Just War and why this is a price 
that should not be paid unthinkingly. A more open-minded, or at least considered, approach to 
ethics and territory within Just War holds out the possibility of a response to these challenges 
that is more intellectually fleet of foot and also better positioned to respond positively to 
alternative ethico-political conceptions of the role of territory in international relations, 
conceptions that are often highlighted as of growing relevance and significance in other areas 
of the discipline and practice of international politics.  
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Just War, humanitarian intervention and the war on terror – a tale of triumph? 
Just War theory has an enviable record of success in shaping, if not dominating, political-
ethical debates about the use of force in international relations. As some have noted, this 
success brings with it certain dangers (Walzer 2002), but sharing Walzer’s general satisfaction 
with the way in which Just War ideas and categories have become unavoidable in thinking 
about and assessing the use of violence is not difficult. Moral scepticism of the sort portrayed 
by Frost (1996) or Dower (1998) may have saloon-bar appeal but Just War’s ubiquity and 
utility, we will come to its intellectual sophistication shortly, seem to have corralled it within 
the realm of those whose cynicism stems from intellectual inadequacy. For those committed to 
the centrality of ethics to both the study and practice of international relations the ‘triumph’ of 
Just War is heartening. 
 
Two particular instances serve to highlight how it is that Just War has been able to shape and 
direct debate, even as the character of violence in international relations has moved away 
from classic inter-state war driven by traditional geo-strategic logics of the control of 
territory and the maximisation of power in pursuit of security from attacks by other states. 
Throughout the 1990s the debate over humanitarian intervention, still alive and well today 
(e.g. Bellamy, 2006), has referred back time and again to the idea of Just War. Whether in the 
form of landmark policy statements (Blair, 1999; ICISS, 2001) or in the majority of the 
leading academic analyses and, in particular, advocacy, of a limited right to humanitarian 
intervention (e.g. Téson, 2005c; Wheeler, 2000) an amended and adjusted Just War 
framework has been central. Augmenting the idea of self-defence as just cause to include a 
right, or possibly even a duty, to defend the victims of grave humanitarian crises; debating 
the nature of legitimate authority in these circumstances in order to minimise the opportunity 
for abuse by the powerful; wrestling with the challenge of intent in multi-faceted situations 
where complex actors may intend multiple outcomes and be motivated by a variety of 
desires; and looking at how Just War’s rules of combat may have to be changed to deal with 
the absence of a ‘battlefield’, in the conventional sense, have all been important elements of 
this process.  
 
The second challenge that, on the triumphalist account, Just War has risen to has been, of 
course, what we can call for the sake of economy, the ‘war on terror,’ in the period post 
September 11th 2001. Despite the political rhetoric about the absence of rules (Hurrell, 2002), 
or the paradigm shattering nature of trans-national, mass casualty terrorism summed up in the 
idea that world changed for ever on 9/11, Just War ideas and categories have remained central 
to public political debate. Again, the reaction has been to augment, refine, adjust and revisit the 
ideas of just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, proportionality, non-combatant 
immunity and so on. Ideas such as preventative war (NSC, 2002; Buchanan and Keohane, 
2004; Elshtain, 2004; Kaufman, 2005) and the notion of ‘illegal combatants’ as a new, 
ethically laden, category into which trans-national terrorists fall (e.g. Aldrich, 2002), have 
sparked vibrant political and academic debates. Some of these revisit old territory, cast with a 
fresh light from the burning towers of the World Trade Centre, such as the permissibility of 
torturing suspects who may have information about planned attacks (e.g. Dershowitz, 2002; 
Krauthammer, 2005). Others are substantively new, such as Téson’s (2005a) efforts to connect 
humanitarian intervention to regime change and the rights of liberal states, especially the US, 
to replace illiberal tyranny in the name of both the victims of such tyrants and the wider call of 
security for the ethically superior liberal parts of the world.  
 
Indeed, Téson’s argument (2005a) symbolises the triumph of Just War theory in his appeal to 
bring together the two post-Cold War challenges to Just War theory’s usual terrain of inter-
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state war into one revised doctrine. This, of course, is not without problems or critics (e.g. 
Nardin, 2005), but it is indicative that Just War theory and Just War theorists have seen in this 
ancient tradition of thought the basis for an effective ethical framework for addressing pressing 
contemporary issues of violence in international relations. Téson’s line of argument is not 
dissimilar to that of Feinstein and Slaughter (2004) who similarly argue for the connection 
between those advocating limited rights of humanitarian intervention and the need to combat 
trans-national terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Whilst they lack the ethical focus and 
moral certainty of Téson, Feinstein and Slaughter (2004: 148-9) still deploy recognisable 
notions of just cause, proportionality, legitimate authority, right intention and last resort 
borrowed from Just War’s lexicon.  
 
Additionally, Buchanan and Keohane (2004: 1, 4) also assume an unproblematic conflation of, 
firstly, cosmopolitan ethical concern with human rights and, secondly, a straightforward 
statement that cosmopolitanism of this stripe is ‘central to the just war tradition and the current 
international legal order’s allowing human rights to limit state sovereignty.’ That would 
certainly come as news to the historians of the Just War tradition or to those, such as pluralist 
members of the English school (e.g. Bull, 1977; Jackson, 2000; Mayall, 2000) who typically 
see rules on violence such as those of the Just War as being principally about protecting the 
rights of states. That Buchanan and Keohane (2004: 5-10)) move on from here to construct a 
defence of preventive war in the face of non-imminent threats of mass-casualty terrorist attack 
further emphasises the highly distinctive way in which human rights, just war, humanitarian 
intervention and anti-terrorist actions have been blended in recent debate (Lee, 2005: 106-7).  
 
The intellectual sophistication of this debate is often impressive, and intimidating. The weight 
of ages bears down heavily on those contributing and heavyweights of the philosophical, 
theological and political theoretical traditions are wheeled out at regular intervals by 
participants to grant vicarious authority to contemporary debate. Saints Augustine and 
Aquinas, Grotius, Kant, Machiavelli, Thucydides, Hobbes, Locke and other stalwarts of the 
Western canon are invoked. Some feel this weight more than others, perhaps, seeing the 
framework that Just War inherits from its venerability as providing a resource base for 
addressing contemporary issues that needs little augmentation. James Turner Johnson (1999) 
stands as perhaps the pre-eminent example of this approach, his ‘Justice and Contemporary 
Warfare’ drawing extensively on the tradition to encompass the contemporary challenges, 
principally of humanitarian intervention, but also applicable to the ‘war on terror’.  
 
Others develop the more ‘applied’ approach of the leading contemporary Just War theorist and 
advocate, Michael Walzer, whose ‘Just and Unjust Wars’ (2000) remains unavoidable in 
discussions of the topic and a source of insight and inspiration for almost anyone who works in 
the field. Walzer also wants to lay some claim to the theological and philosophical strands of 
the tradition, but it is its ability to throw light on historical ‘illustrations’ and the way in which 
Just War has learnt from, adapted to and engaged with historical trends in the material 
capabilities of violence that is its key virtue. Just War is a living tradition, and all the better for 
not being inextricably tied to foundational theological or philosophical claims about the nature 
of human beings, law or the divinely ordained order of things. Secularised, goes the argument, 
Just War is stronger, although we should not forget that, as Elshtain notes (2003: 69), we don’t 
have to scratch too deep before we ‘… find a theological claim lurking underneath.’ 
 
This secularisation is partially the product of the insertion of Just War thinking into the 
‘Westphalian’ world, as Elshtain terms it (2003: 69), and thus the logic of an international 
society or societies that arise as a result (e.g. Bull, 1977; Keene, 2002). But it is also connected 
to the role of Just War in shaping international law and the development of the international 
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legal tradition, particularly its positivist incarnations where rational interest underpins 
jurisprudential reasoning and the nature and purpose of public law. The Hague and Geneva 
Conventions and the creation of what Walzer (2000) calls ‘the legalist paradigm’ as the 
dominant contemporary incarnation of Just War thinking exemplify this trend, adding further 
to the intellectual credentials of Just War via the distinctive contribution of legal reasoning and 
the accretion of treaty and customary law. The idea of legitimacy as a politico-legal construct, 
associated most closely with Thomas Franck (1990), and the decline of strict legal positivism 
and therefore the re-connection of legal manifestations of Just War thinking with wider 
normative theoretical debate are a further instance of the complexity, sophistication, rigour and 
sheer volume of material available for contemporary Just War theorists to draw upon.  
 
This final example of the sophistication of the debate that I wish to highlight is the 
development of a new category within Just War thinking, adding the idea of jus post bellum to 
the traditional jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Johnson (1999: 191-218) is amongst those 
developing this category, although he doesn’t use the label, reiterating the fact that even those 
who stick most closely to the classical resources of the tradition are able to innovate and 
respond to contemporary challenges. Evans (2005: 19-20), Rigby (2005) and Hayden (2005) 
develop an explicit discussion of the jus post bellum, and earlier discussions of humanitarian 
intervention, such as Wheeler (2000), implicitly require such a category because of their 
emphasis on the need for long-term commitment to prevent the recurrence of humanitarian 
disasters necessitating intervention to ‘save strangers’. In policy circles, the ICISS (2001) also 
deploy such a notion, via a ‘responsibility to rebuild’ as an inherent component of the 
‘responsibility to protect’.  
 
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought home the necessity of jus post bellum in the 
‘war on terror’, too. They have also demonstrated the enormously difficult task that this can 
represent when establishing such justice is inextricably entangled with a concept that is 
deeply indebted to liberalism, yet local circumstances are not necessarily hospitable to that 
political doctrine. In some ways, this, too, is recapturing the richness of the Just War 
tradition. Restoration of the status quo ante bellum as being about all that needed to be said 
on this subject, and thus covered by the right intention principle of the jus ad bellum, stands 
in contrast to the idea of punishment that was prominent in the classic, Christian texts on Just 
War. It is notable, though, that some analysts, such as Gilbert (2003: 100-1) argue that the 
war on terror has much of the character of punitive punishment that the medieval tradition 
included. Certainly some contemporary jus post bellum ideas recapture some of that spirit, 
for example in seeing arraigning those responsible for gross human rights abuses before 
appropriate, often international, courts as essential. I have no intention of getting involved in 
the restorative versus retributive justice debate (e.g. Gilbert, 2003: 103-51; Rigby, 2005; 
Schaap, 2005) in post-conflict societies, but, again, the sophistication of this discussion 
highlights the significance of the move to a serious consideration of the nature and content of 
jus post bellum.  
 
More pertinent to this paper is the way in which jus post bellum has been linked to political 
transformation in post conflict societies towards the embedding of liberal democratic values, 
concepts, institutions and practices. This applies whether we are dealing with the aftermath of 
humanitarian intervention or action pursuant to the war on terror. In some its strongest 
statements (e.g. Elshtain, 2003; 2004; Téson, 2005a) jus post bellum is almost defined by the 
creation of the institutions of liberal democracy. Those who oppose or reject liberal ideas, 
values and principles are guilty of a criminal act and thus lose any standing within the idea of 
Just War. As criminals ‘… their opposition to intervention does not count’ (Téson, 2005a: 16) 
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– it is illegal to act with the intention of preventing the creation of a liberal state or from 
illiberal or anti-liberal motives, and criminals lose any defensive rights that Just War accords.  
 
Téson’s characterisation of this argument may verge on the caricature. Nardin (2005), in a 
critique of Téson, describes his view as ‘humanitarian imperialism’, a label Téson accepts 
(2005b: 30), arguing that this represents a revolution in the understanding of the nature of the 
Just War tradition, established understandings of humanitarian intervention and the character 
of the international system of sovereign states. Whilst I am generally sympathetic to most of 
Nardin’s points, both he and Téson, and Elshtain (2003), share a statist approach that has been 
the source of criticism of the Just War tradition in the past, at present and, in a hopefully 
somewhat distinctive way, is a source of criticism for this paper as well. However, having 
sketched the ways Just War has responded to the challenges of humanitarian intervention and 
the ‘war on terror’, largely successfully in the eyes of those canvassed above, it is time to look 
at the nature of some of the critiques, especially those that connect to and contextualise the 
specific argument I wish to make in response to the triumph of Just War theory. 
Challenging Just War theory 
One of the oldest challenges to Just War stems from the idea, most commonly associated with 
Kant, that its advocates are the ‘sorry comforters’ of war. Just War theory has offered spurious 
ethical weight to a realm of human activity that, at best, can be seen as an occasionally 
necessary evil in the face of even worse evils, but not one that can ever claim any sort of 
ethical virtue.  
 
Pacifism, whether religiously motivated – and, of course, overcoming Christian pacifism was 
one of the reasons behind the development of Just War thinking – or inspired by a secular 
philosophical commitment (e.g. Reader, 2000) continues to challenge Just War. However, 
pacifism’s challenge is one which we have to either accept, and thus reject Just War, or 
reject, in which case Just War becomes the default position for those who nevertheless wish 
to recognise the ethical dimension to warfare and avoid some kind of moral scepticism. More 
interesting to this paper is the way in which the idea of human rights is being used to critique 
Just War theory, leading to a debate over whether or not human rights are compatible with, 
and even enhanced by, a commitment to maintaining classic Just War principles and 
practices. We have seen how some (Buchanan and Keohane, 2004; Téson, 2005) have seen 
little difficulty with this. Others have debated whether human rights serve as a useful analogy 
for Just War principles, for example is the state’s right to self defence analogous to that of 
individuals, or is it instead the cumulative result of the individual rights of the state’s citizens 
(e.g. Gilbert, 2003: 24-46; McMahan, 2004; Rodin, 2004; Ryan, 2004)? 
 
Alternatively, Martin Shaw (2005) has used human rights as a central part of his critique of 
what he labels ‘risk transfer war’, which characterises, he argues, the ways in which the 
leading Western military powers, most importantly the US, have pursued military operations 
in the last decade. This stands as the latest incarnation of what he (2003) labels ‘degenerate 
war’ – the process by which, throughout the twentieth century, war became increasingly 
focused on the killing of civilians and the destruction of societies. That this process has been 
driven by the leading powers throughout this time, means that it is impossible to see this as 
being a consequence of ‘degenerate’ regimes, such as Nazi Germany. Neither is it limited to 
the increasingly significant phenomena of ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 1999), in which the collapse 
of legitimate political authority helps bring about brutal internecine conflicts driven by 
ideological, religious or nationalist prejudice, economic enrichment or some combination of 
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the two. For Shaw, the wars fought in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq are from the same stable 
as those in Democratic Republic of Congo, Chechnya or Liberia.  
 
What characterises this commonality is the abuse of human rights. In the latter conflicts this 
is perhaps more obvious, because of the way in which pillage, rape, mutilation, massacre and 
torture are routinely deployed by those ostensibly part of armed organisations. In the case of 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, however, the degeneracy is less immediately apparent. 
Although abuses such as those at Abu Ghraib, Camp Breadbasket, CIA ‘black prisons’ and 
Guantanomo Bay are widespread enough to call into question the ‘bad apple’ explanations 
routinely offered by the US and UK political and military establishments, Shaw’s argument 
is somewhat different. His claim is that contemporary Western warfare abuses human rights 
because of the way that it transfers risk from Western combatants to the non-combatants of 
the state where the conflict is taking place, even when the state apparatus may not be the 
target of military action.  
 
Thus, even though, precision guided munitions have enabled Western militaries to avoid 
some of the most blatant instances of degeneracy, such as the area bombing of cities with the 
express intent of killing civilians, the pattern of transferring risk to civilians has in fact 
accelerated. Within casualty figures that may be lower overall, the proportion of enemy non-
combatants being killed or injured has risen, and risen dramatically. In the war over Kosovo, 
famously, NATO forces suffered no combat deaths. In the war to overthrow the Taliban, the 
only US combat death was of a CIA agent caught up in a riot of prisoners of war. The prison 
was subsequently levelled and the vast majority of the prisoners killed, despite their non-
combatant status in Just War terms (Shaw, 2003: 126-7, 238-40; Gilbert, 2003: 101). 
 
Shaw’s critique is powerful and thought-provoking. His challenging of arguments commonly 
offered that precision guided munitions offer a welcome opportunity to restore a degree of 
discrimination between combatant and non-combatant (e.g. Elshtain, 2003: 69 n. 6) that the 
industrialised warfare of the twentieth century had seemingly destroyed turns on the balance 
of risk and the relationship to human rights. Shaw argues that the rights of Western 
combatants are now almost automatically placed ahead of those of enemy non-combatants. 
Saving soldiers lives at the cost of civilians is a part of the degeneracy of warfare, and even if 
the scale of civilian losses may be lower in terms of outright numbers they now make up a 
larger and larger proportion of those killed and injured, with Western combatants becoming 
less and less likely to be killed or injured (Shaw, 2003: 238-40; 2005).  
 
Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan may have done something to restore the vulnerability of 
Western troops, but even here the number of civilians being killed dwarfs the number of 
troops. Shaw thus argues that, from the perspective of human rights, the Just War tradition has 
comprehensively failed to rein in the degenerate tendencies of warfare. Just War thinking has 
lost touch with the human rights tradition that alone can ground an ethical framework for 
thinking about the systematic and organised use of violence.  
 
Shaw’s critique plugs into a wider trend in thinking about war, one with which Just War has 
not engaged. This is to appeal to different notions of the role, nature and meaning of territory in 
international politics as part of the emergence of non-state based conceptions of space and 
scale (e.g. Agnew, 2003; Scholte, 2005). Globalisation is a part of this, and the idea of a 
‘global war on terror’ and ways in which Tony Blair has tried to locate both humanitarian 
intervention and anti-terrorism within a context of globalisation (Williams with Roach, 2006) 
point to these connections. However, the global scope of human rights claims underpinning 
humanitarian intervention (and Shaw’s critique of Just War) and the trans-national 
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characterisation of al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations can be seen in the same light. 
Even the notion of ‘new wars’ raise questions not just about the brutality of the violence they 
engender but also about the understanding of territory that participants evoke. Sometimes, most 
notably in former Yugoslavia, this is about statehood and a national homeland, but even there, 
and more so in other places, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, controlling territory is 
nothing to do with seeking a homeland or commanding political authority in the name of a 
political programme, it is about economic activity – ‘banditstans’. Political fears about ‘failed 
states’ have also shifted from the humanitarian catastrophe that followed the disintegration of 
political authority in Somalia and left it without a recognised government, to ‘failed states’ as 
havens for trans-national terrorists.  
 
A lot of the contemporary Just War debate makes explicit references to the notion of 
‘Westphalian’ states and even where this nomenclature is absent, the understanding of territory 
in Just War debates typically fits this general pattern (e.g. Gilbert, 2003: 103-4; Elshtain, 2003: 
65). Here, to borrow Elshtain’s (2003: 65) words, ‘The presumption of state sovereignty held 
that the state alone was the arbiter of what counted as justice, law and freedom within its 
bounded territory.’ Whilst, as we have seen, Just War theorists like Elshtain have been keen to 
set limits to permissible interpretations of justice, law and freedom, the notion that the 
institutionalisation and operationalisation of these crucial ethical values revolves around the 
state remains almost unchallenged in the Just War literature this paper has surveyed. So, for 
example, for Buchanan and Keohane (2004) the institutions that will hold accountable states 
(and it is states alone) that carry out preventive military operations are the United Nations, 
backed-up by a coalition of democratic states. For Téson (2005), Just War will reform 
tyrannical states to make them partners in the protection and promotion of human rights, rights 
understood, as Elshtain argues (2004) to require a territorialized political authority claiming 
sovereignty if they are to be practically meaningful.  
 
However, this conception of territory is not to be taken for granted and the constellation of 
identity, values, authority, security and power that accrue in this rich and complex notion of the 
state is certainly not a fixture of the past 350 or so years since Westphalia. Such a myth, 
although widespread and deep-rooted, is relatively novel – potentially as recent an invention as 
the late 1940s (Stirk, 2006). Political geographers (e.g. Agnew and Corbridge, 1995) and 
particularly those falling under the critical geopolitics rubric (e.g. Thuathail, 1996) have 
explored the ways in which understandings of the nature and role of territory are connected to 
power political practices to show how territory and territoriality are highly political and 
dynamic phenomena. The relationship between territory, society and the state is a complex one 
and thus the relationship between territory and the values of such societies, including notions 
of justice and freedom, is far from being straightforward (e.g. Hakli, 2001). Our spatial ideas 
about scale, territory and borders play a significant role in what we value and how we value it, 
and thus in our ethical perspective on violence legitimised in the name of justice. The 
bordering of sovereignty within precise, razor-sharp lines on the map, is one example of ways 
that the meaning and significance of certain pieces of territory have altered. Border zones as 
places where security and identity are often under threat, places where wars are most likely to 
occur and places where sovereign authority is most visible through the policing of entry and 
exit from the state is one instance of this geographical distinctiveness (e.g. Andreas, 2003; 
Donnan and Wilson, 1999; Newman and Paasi, 1998; Williams, 2006). Experiences, such as 
that of the EU, show how the location, significance and character of borders can change, with 
the development of the Schengen agreement pushing these classic ‘sovereign’ function of 
controlling ingress and egress away from sovereign state like Belgium or Holland, which lack 
non-Schengen land borders, and towards the EU’s periphery and the idea of ‘fortress Europe’ 
being in the hands of the Slovaks, Poles, Slovenians, Greeks, Spaniards and others. This serves 
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to ‘de-naturalise’ the border of European states, reinforcing the need to think about activity like 
security, immigration and belonging at multiple scales and in spaces distinct from the 
‘Westphalian’ state (Walters, 2002).  
 
The scale at which security analysis within international relations takes place has also moved 
away from the state, to a position whereby regions are increasingly central to a diversified 
security agenda in which war and military action play an important but not necessarily 
dominant part (e.g. Buzan and Waever, 2003). Structural theories of state behaviour in 
international relations are also being pushed towards recognising regions as being of growing 
significance in political analysis. Buzan’s (2005a) reappraisal of the English school, and his 
efforts to systematise its theory, produce both a renewed understanding of structure in English 
school theory and a clear commitment to adding a regional dimension to its scales of analysis. 
Similarly, his account of polarity (Buzan, 2005b) and the reintroduction of a category of ‘great 
power’ to augment ‘superpower’ and ‘other’ rests in important ways on the significance of 
regions and regional scope of a state’s power projection capabilities and political ambitions.  
 
War, and the justice or otherwise of war, are not subjects that Buzan devotes much attention to 
in his analyses of security, the English school, or polarity and the future trajectory of world 
politics, although Just War theory has a central position in the English school’s normative 
agenda of creating and maintaining rules on violence (e.g. Bull, 1977). Nevertheless, this trend 
in security studies away from an almost purely statist analysis reinforces the sense in which 
responses to humanitarian intervention, trans-national terrorism and general debates about 
security are potentially in touch with ideas of changing scale, differing conceptions of political 
space and an awareness of the potential diversity in understandings of territory. Just War 
theory, though, appears to be heading in the opposite direction. The state is not only retaining 
its traditional central position, but this is being reinforced, and at some potential cost to Just 
War’s ability to effective engage with contemporary warfare. Whilst it is on this aspect of the 
problem that this paper focuses it is noteworthy that contemporary discussion of the political 
geography of war has not focused much on the ethics of war and the Just War tradition (e.g. 
Flint, 2003), so there is a failure to engage from both sides. 
Space, scale, the state and ethics 
It would seem uncontroversial to argue that the state has been at the centre of Just War thinking 
for the last two hundred years at least. The current intellectual developments by leading Just 
War theorists serve, if anything, to further embed this centrality. What is striking about this is 
that the move is a self-consciously ethical one – the state, so long the subject of ethical 
suspicion and critique – is being portrayed as at the heart of an ethical response to 
humanitarian abuse and terrorist violence. More specifically, the state is being portrayed as the 
vehicle for the just war against these ills and the basis for a lasting solution to them, especially 
when, as is increasingly argued, they meld into one.  
 
Perhaps most striking here is Elshtain’s (2003, 2004, 2005) deployment of Just War arguments 
in defence of military intervention that connect these to the creation, or re-creation, of an 
‘ordinary civic peace’ (Elshtain, 2004: 46) as the sine qua non for ethical life. This civic peace 
requires a set of effective state institutions, but also requires that these take certain forms, are 
limited in power and held accountable in certain ways and are animated by a particular ethos of 
service to those over whom they exercise their limited authority. Elshtain sees just wars against 
those who preside over, whether through intention or neglect, humanitarian catastrophes or 
terrorist activity as being about a just war to bring the victims of such abuse within the embrace 
of a liberal democratic state.  
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Utilising the contingency of sovereignty that humanitarian intervention placed on the agenda, 
Elshtain (2003, 2004), in common with Téson (2005a), extends this contingency to taking 
effective measures against trans-national terrorist organisations, principally al Qaeda and 
similar groups. The threat they represent to the creation of civic peace in places such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and their potential to disrupt the civic peace of the US and other 
established Western democracies, generates just cause, and also compromises, if not removes, 
the sovereignty of those states that harbour or aid and abet them. The role and nature of the 
state as a political institution thus becomes an object of debate about just cause and also about 
legitimate authority and right intention within the jus ad bellum side of the Just War tradition. 
The authority of those states that maintain ordinary civic peace is superior to those that do not. 
The legitimate state is one that protects and promotes the rights and interests of its citizens, 
starting with their entitlement to live securely within a territorially bounded zone of ordinary 
civic peace. Where states fail to or are unwilling to deliver this, or are involved with 
organisations committed to the destruction of civic peace then, as with those murderous 
regimes who oversee humanitarian catastrophe, they lose any serious claim to legitimacy. They 
lack legitimate authority and their intention in resisting Western power is ethically 
reprehensible because it is about denying humans their right to live within a zone of ordinary 
civic peace. For Téson (2005a: 17), this leads to a clear statement of the ethical superiority of 
the intentions and authority of liberal democratic states: ‘the fact that the West has 
disproportionate influence on the [United Nations] Security Council is one of its good features. 
… It is unacceptable that the decision whether to free people from tyranny, or to veto any such 
decision, be left to illegitimate regimes.’ 
 
This ordinary civic peace is necessarily territorialized and connected to the sovereign state. 
Elshtain (2003: 63) is clear about this – ‘Justice demands accountability and there is no 
political accountability where there is no structure of power and law. … Absent such a 
structure, culminating in some form of political sovereignty [and] the likelihood of what we 
now routinely call “humanitarian catastrophes” is magnified manyfold.’ Her argument 
throughout Just War Against Terror reiterates this – if we believe in irreducible and inalienable 
notions of human dignity then we have to create and preserve areas of ordinary civic peace and 
in the absence of a plausible or desirable arrangement for securing that at the global level, the 
sovereign state is the best available means. That it is through the state that we plug this 
ordinary civic peace into the shared values, traditions and history of a community reinforces 
the security of civic peace. Relations between those states, though, cannot be separated off 
from this ethical imperative, seeing international relations as operating under different rules 
and according to a different ethical logic. Co-existence among states that secure the ordinary 
civic peace is unproblematic, but for those that do not, and in relations with non-state 
organisations that explicitly reject this ethical imperative, in favour, most commonly, of some 
kind of religious or ideological zealotry, coercion is justified and necessary. Retreat from the 
world by those states that fulfil these ethical imperatives is both self-defeating, because it 
allows their enemies the opportunity to prepare attacks, and an abrogation of their obligation to 
liberate those blighted by terrorism and tyranny.  
 
Thus the state remains at the heart of the complex nexus of the search for order and justice 
which has for so long been a vital element of normative debate in international relations (e.g. 
Bull, 1977: 77-98). Whether the injustice is humanitarian catastrophe or trans-national terrorist 
attack then fighting a Just War against these ills offers the best way, both practically and 
ethically, of bringing about the necessary preconditions for human beings to enjoy inalienable 
dignity. Equal regard, argues Elshtain (2003: 64), is about ‘… an equal claim to the use of 
coercive force on your behalf, if you are a victim of one of the many horrors attendant upon 
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radical political instability.’ In a typically bravura finale (2003: 75), she argues that through her 
approach, ‘The brutal Melian rule is hereby reversed: The strong do what they must in order 
that the weak not suffer what they too often will.’ 
 
Appealing to the state as the solution to problems of human rights abuses is, patently, 
problematic, and hoping that the ‘strong’ will respond to this ethical imperative sits ill with 
someone who castigates Anthony Burke’s (2005) more traditionally internationalist critique as 
‘the new utopianism’ (Elshtain, 2005). It is too easy, though, to see this as just a statist 
hangover from the time when Just War addressed inter-state conflict as its principal, if not sole, 
concern. It is true, though, that the principles with which we are so familiar are most easily 
applicable in the context of inter-state war or, with some adjustment, a civil war in which 
control of the state is the object of all parties. As this paper has already argued, though, that 
statist perspective on the space and scale of violence and security is widely challenged. 
Equally, notions of justice outside of the issue of violence, most obviously in debates about 
distributive justice, routinely extend beyond the state to the global level (e.g. Beitz, 1979). 
These wider realms of justice are not unrecognised, indeed, Elshtain’s (2003: 74) notion of 
equal regard demands such recognition, worked out in terms of concentric circles of obligation. 
However, when it comes to the political authority able to grant justice, and the relationship 
between individuals and that authority, we are thrown, inextricably, it seems, back into the 
clutches of the state and a classic liberal notion of citizenship.  
 
This is, in part, to recognise the way in which the US government in particular has tended to 
re-cast trans-national terrorist threats into a statist discourse (e.g. Williams with Roach, 2006: 
2). The labelling of states as members of an ‘axis of evil’, the ascription of responsibility for 
combating terrorism to governments – it was governments who were to decide whether they 
were either ‘with us [the United States], or with the terrorists’ (Bush, 2001) – and the 
interdiction of terrorist ambitions to acquire WMD via preventing state acquisition of such 
technologies is telling in relation to a stubbornly ‘Westphalian’ world view. But more to the 
point here is that the academic debate about Just War, humanitarian intervention and terrorism, 
especially when the latter two are connected, quickly does the same thing. The targets of a Just 
War, though, do not share this geographical perspective. 
 
The distinctiveness of the political programme that motivates a network, and the very idea of a 
networked form of organisation, point to a distinctive conception of political space and scale. 
The ethical debate about the use of violence in response to humanitarian crises and trans-
national terrorist organisations needs to extend beyond debates over the ethical character of the 
state, the ethics of citizenship and the nature and extent of international ethical obligation. 
Whether seeking to use Just War theory to ground a limited right to humanitarian intervention, 
with, notably, long-term obligations to re-build a functioning and hopefully liberal state 
(Wheeler, 2000; ICISS, 2001); or to justify the pursuit, by the world’s leading power, of 
military action against terrorists and states that may abet them (Elshtain, 2004), the issue of 
scale arises.  
 
At its crudest, but this might serve as a simple illustration, we can see this in the distinction 
drawn within Islam, and particularly important to those who seek Islamic justification for jihad 
as holy war against non-believers, between the dar al Islam and dar al harb. The realm of Islam 
– of truth, justice and peace – and the realm of war which the true believer is duty bound to 
conquer, destroying those who do not convert, may be a deeply problematic reading of Islamic 
teaching, but it also highlights a radically different notion of political, and ethical, scale. The 
sense of injustice against Muslims being felt throughout the umma – the community of 
believers – is a powerful rhetorical tool, but also a notion of ethical scale that does not have a 
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parallel in Western liberalism. The geographical dispersal of injustices across different places, 
or the seemingly distinctive political causes or manifestations of injustice that, to a liberal 
perspective, generate incoherence, may have commonality from the perspective of a different 
scale.  
 
For liberals, one moves from the community of citizenship to the community of humanity and 
the idea of universal rights. Regional citizenships, institutionalised in the European Union, of 
course, do not (yet?) have ethical resonance, it seems. This paper lacks the space, and its author 
the expertise, to develop these themes in further depth, but it does highlight one way in which 
our notions of ethical scale may not track across to other ethical traditions. This does not have 
to result in a communitarian account, ruling out most, but not necessarily all, of the claims to 
ethical universality (e.g. Walzer, 1983, 1994), but it does help us recognise that there are 
different ethical scales, and thus a need for different political scales, too, from those that are the 
commonplaces of the Western ethical and political imagination. Political programmes that 
appeal to these different and distinctive ethical spaces and scales may not be incoherent, as 
they frequently appear, and they should not be dismissed without due consideration. That, of 
course, is not to deny the possibility of incoherence or ethical indefensibility, but hard-wiring a 
notion of ordinary civic peace, for example, into a statist territorial political programme 
connected to sovereignty and an ethical scale that privileges the state cannot be done without 
serious discussion of alternatives. Equally, our notion of Just War has to recognise the 
challenges here, too. 
Just War and the ethical primacy of the state 
The state-centrism of the Just War tradition over the last two hundred years continues to cast a 
long shadow in the face of debates over the use of violence that appeal to the universal – 
humanitarianism – and the trans-national – religious fundamentalist terrorism. The bordered, 
territorial political community claiming sovereignty offers a reassuring hearth around which 
we can regroup and reconsider how to respond ethically to these challenges. The problem, 
particularly in relation to trans-national political projects and programmes, is that this response 
is unable to engage effectively with such challenges. A military response may be ethically 
correct, but the worry here is that the dice are loaded in favour of a military response on the 
grounds that the political programmes and projects of trans-national scale are more or less 
automatically excluded from ethical consideration.  
 
This is not to defend the violent, and especially terroristic, pursuit of such programmes. It is, 
though, to reiterate that by increasingly embedding the ideal-type of the liberal state at the 
heart of the jus ad bellum principles of legitimate authority, just cause and right intent in 
particular, the contemporary debate about Just War denies the ethical power that such projects 
can claim, and grants to states an ethical standing that the record of even the most liberal might 
struggle to live up to. This paper has no trouble with the idea that some forms of state are 
ethically superior to others and that ethical relativism is inadequate, so is not arguing for such a 
standpoint. But the value that exists in non-state based forms of political identity and 
community; in ethical codes that do not take their frame of reference from a specific, 
territorialized perspective; and from notions of security, authority and obligation that exist at 
scales different from the state and the global is denied by these contemporary developments in 
Just War thinking. 
 
Turning from the ‘negative’ side of this debate – what is ethically condemnable – to the 
positive – what is laudable – serves only to reinforce this problem. The prescription for 
ethically defensible responses to these challenges is to recognise the combination of might and 
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right to be found in the liberal states of the world, and especially the United States, which 
possesses not only a position of military dominance but also a historical, cultural and political 
legacy of unique virtue. US exceptionalism is not just a trait in US political culture (e.g. Buzan, 
2005b: 154-64), it is a reflection of the ethical superiority of the United States (Elshtain, 2003: 
64, 73; 2004: 168-73; Téson, 2005: 19-20). This is not an ethical vision of a liberal global civil 
society, or a trans-national network of humanitarian and human rights NGOs, but instead a 
coalition of willing liberal states, under the leadership of the USA, utilising international 
organisations where possible, by-passing them when necessary, in pursuit of a world where 
new allies are created via the implantation of just political arrangements and the defeat of 
ethically bankrupt challengers. It is not surprising that the label ‘imperialism’ has returned to 
prominence. 
 
Thus Just War thinking arguably faces the need to address a lack of geographical imagination 
in its response to these key contemporary debates about the ethics of violence in international 
relations. This has implications for all three of the divisions of the just war tradition – jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum. This paper lacks the space to explore these in full, but 
hopefully certain instances may illustrate the potentially significant challenges that could arise.  
 
For the jus ad bellum the state as the site of legitimate authority and therefore the key declarer 
and prosecutor of war has been challenged, especially in discussions of humanitarian 
intervention, by the idea of the UN Security Council as a superior authority (in both senses of 
the word). This, however, retains the statist basis of the legitimate authority principle and also 
limits the perspective of just cause to those instances where the Security Council can agree to 
utilise the elasticity in the idea of threats to international peace and security. Recognising the 
moral authority of non-state actors in this regard and the justice of causes which are inherently 
ill-suited to a statist framing or mediation becomes very difficult and Just War becomes allied 
to a conservative interpretation of international relations. The alternative scales and differently 
territorialized conceptions of space in these programmes are ill-served by the established Just 
War discourse, and the developments in the theory over the last decade have done little to 
address this effectively. This is despite the inherent notions of space and scale within jus ad 
bellum principles, such as proportionality, which asks us to consider the balance between the 
harm of the originating act of violence against the harm of the putative violent response. The 
geographical extent of that violence is part of this – a global war on terror, for instance, 
suggests a violent response could occur anywhere. However, the reality has been the corralling 
of an ostensibly ‘global’ scale within a state-based framework. Equally, the spaces of violence 
have also remained largely conventional in terms of the ethical debate – the ‘battlespace’ has 
remained, conceptually, the ‘battlefield’ – a discrete and specific geographical location where 
those who are permissibly subject to violence congregate. Securing spaces where either 
political authority is complicit with terrorist networks or where authority is so weak as to be 
unable to prevent their operations is a commonplace in political debates about the war on terror 
(e.g. Williams with Roach, 2006). A distinction is still drawn, though, between this and a 
‘battlefield’ – the ethical location of legitimate large-scale violence. 
 
Talk of the ‘battlefield’ raises the issue of the implications of this argument for the jus in bello. 
Here the categories of combatant and non-combatant have been challenged anew. Some (e.g. 
Buzan, 2002) have risked advocating a re-opening of the debate within Just War whereby the 
innocence of non-combatants is connected to their not presenting a real or imminent threat of 
violence, as opposed to being innocent of any political commitment to support an unjust 
political project. When that political project lies outside of the established, state-focused 
frameworks Just War is used to dealing with, then the problem is exacerbated. Can one be a 
combatant in the name of a trans-national political project that cannot be accommodated within 
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the dominant contemporary geographical framework, and can one claim the authority of acting 
in the name of the leaders of such a project? Whilst this helps to highlight the long-standing 
problem in relation to terrorists as either combatants or non-combatants, and leaving aside the 
US government’s designation of ‘illegal combatants’ in order to open some room for 
manoeuvre on this issue, the question of proportionality is at stake here, as well. Whilst the 
combatant/non-combatant distinction has grabbed most of the attention in the war on terror, 
and also in humanitarian intervention debates where the status of irregular paramilitary forces 
has been important, the issue of proportionality is also potentially controversial.  
 
The global war on terror, for example, places at the centre of the challenge the idea of trans-
national terrorist networks, loosely affiliated to one another and based on local cells, operating 
across borders and with little connection to established, territorialized political authority. 
However, do our ethical concerns about the proportionality of violence reflect this, or, if not, 
how does this contribute to the debate about military operations? When judging the 
proportionality of violence do we judge against the damage inflicted against ‘global terrorism’, 
if such a label has utility, or do we judge it against the local cell and the environment in which 
they are operating? Given the looseness of the affiliations and the absence of centralised 
command and control characteristic of networked terrorism where, for example, al Qaeda is 
likened to a brand rather than any sort of centralised structure, can attacks in one place be 
justified in terms of proportionality by reference to damaging affiliated elements of the 
network elsewhere?  
 
Finally, the jus post bellum standard that emerges from the literature on humanitarian 
intervention and the war on terror seems focused on creating functioning states. Ideally these 
are liberal and democratic in character, able to establish, protect and embed social, political and 
economic structures that will secure the new state in the short-term and, looking further ahead, 
bring about the kind of civic peace Elshtain advocates. This foundation will also help create 
economic prosperity to address social exclusion and disillusionment that are often portrayed as 
deep-rooted explanations for the attractions of violence. Irrespective of the empirical accuracy 
of these claims, this is, by any standards, a Herculean political task. It also represents an ethical 
prescription out of kilter with the Just War tradition’s far more limited practice of addressing 
the immediate causes of war. Of course, the advocates of a more ethically ambitious and 
transformative Just War are able to appeal to classical authority for their ideas – the idea of a 
Just War being one that will ensure there is no need to repeat the exercise, and thus the need to 
get to the root causes. However, the record in Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq 
so far gives serious pause for thought about the viability of such an approach, practically and 
ethically.  
 
More extensively, this paper has raised questions about the viability of a statist strategy for 
addressing the challenge of jus post bellum. As we have seen, ethics, identity and security are 
being addressed at different scales and in different spaces, and these, too, need to be part of the 
mix of debate about an ethical response to post-conflict societies and how to effectively 
address terrorism. Just War thinking has yet to pick up on this in a systematic fashion and 
explore in depth and with sustained attention the opportunity for different spaces and scales to 
play a positive role in how we think and act ethically in response to the aftermath of armed 
conflict.  
Conclusion 
The longevity, flexibility and sophistication of the Just War tradition is imposing and its 
centrality to contemporary debates about humanitarian intervention and the war on terror 
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unsurprising as a result. However, the question of the political spaces that the Just War 
tradition envisages as the location of ethical debate and behaviour and the political scale at 
which it operates are potentially problematic. Humanitarian crises and trans-national terrorism 
pose important questions in both these regards and, so far, Just War thinking has not picked 
them up. The state retains its central position in all three arenas of contemporary Just War 
thinking and this is hampering its ability to respond, not in terms of ethical critique of human 
rights abuses and terrorist attacks – these are goals into which Just War theorists have found it 
easy to hit balls – but in terms of accommodating, even recognising, the potential ethical 
import of non-state based frames of political reference and scales of political activity. This 
paper has suggested this is a problem that is rooted deeply in the Just War tradition and that a 
more dynamic approach to these topics in other parts of international relations is not being 
followed through here.  
 
A comprehensive analysis of what this might mean in terms of exploiting Just War’s famed 
flexibility to better meet this challenge is a long-term project a single paper cannot hope to 
attempt. However, I have tried to sketch some sort of agenda, or at least a set of provisional 
starting points in jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum terms. If nothing else these 
have hopefully served to highlight the ubiquity of the problem that a lack of open-mindedness 
to the problems of scale and space represent. Territory, borders and ethics have received fairly 
limited consideration in the past, especially in international relations (e.g. Williams, 2006), but 
that position, it is argued here, is unsustainable. Just War theory has made some adjustments to 
address the changing ethics of violence of the last fifteen years, but now it needs to take on the 
recognition, evident elsewhere, that our political spaces and scales are diversifying and, as a 
result, our political ethics, including the ethics of war, are under renewed pressure and in need 
of renewed innovation. The next chapter in the long history of Just War theory needs to be 
about ethics, space and scale.  
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